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INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
frequently exercised its exclusive statutory jurisdiction under  
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) to hear appeals from the U.S. Court of 
International Trade.1  With this broad authority to hear the full 
panoply of cases involving the complex and organic regime of U.S. 
trade laws and regulations, the Federal Circuit each year must rule on 
complex and diverse questions of law.  The Federal Circuit issued 
nineteen international trade-related precedential opinions in the 
                                                          
 * Associate, International Trade & Regulatory practice, Alston & Bird LLP, 
Washington, D.C.; J.D., cum laude, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., 
Johns Hopkins University.  Mr. Fitch’s practice includes trade litigation—including 
Section 337 investigations before the International Trade Commission—and 
compliance with customs law, export controls, and economic sanctions programs.  
While in law school, Mr. Fitch served as a law clerk to the U.S. Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on the Constitution.  This Area Summary represents 
the views of the Author alone and not those of Alston & Bird LLP or its clients. 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2006). 
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2009 calendar year, spanning issues as varied as tariff classification, 
drawback requests, antidumping duty proceedings and the 
constitutionality of the now-repealed Byrd Amendment. 
This Article reviews the Federal Circuit’s 2009 decisions dealing 
with international trade-related matters.  While some decisions 
turned on extremely fact-specific issues—often relevant only to that 
action’s litigants—others will undoubtedly alter agency practice for 
the foreseeable future at U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(Customs), the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) and the 
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC).  This Article separates 
the 2009 international trade decisions of the Federal Circuit into two 
main areas:  (1) customs law and (2) trade remedies at Commerce 
and the ITC. 
I. U.S. CUSTOMS LAWS 
Customs cases once again represented a significant portion of the 
Federal Circuit’s 2009 international trade decisions.  More than half 
of the Federal Circuit’s eleven 2009 Customs decisions concerned 
tariff classification.2  Others concerned drawback requests and 
requests for refunds of fees incurred by importers in the ordinary 
course of business.3  One case concerned the ability of brokers to seek 
judicial review of license revocations caused by their failure to file 
reports concerning their brokering activities.4  The Federal Circuit 
generally expresses deference to the decisions of Customs, but has 
not shown any reluctance to intervene on behalf of private litigants 
when circumstances warrant. 
A. Tariff Classification 
In 2009, the Federal Circuit decided five tariff classification cases.  
These cases involved disagreements between importers or 
manufacturers and Customs about where certain products fall within 
the voluminous Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 
(HTSUS), a system of ten-digit codes that purports to cover the full 
panoply of products imported into the United States.  These ten-digit 
codes are significant to importers, as they determine the duty rate 
                                                          
 2. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/dailylog.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010); see infra Part 
I.A. 
 3. See infra Parts I.B, I.D. 
 4. Schick v. United States, 554 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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attached to a product and whether its country of origin entitles it to 
preferential treatment.5 
The Federal Circuit ruled on the classification of Canadian cut 
lumber in Millenium Lumber Distribution Ltd. v. United States.6  
Millenium appealed the Court of International Trade’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the government that Customs 
correctly classified Millenium’s lumber under HTSUS heading 4407, 
which covers “[w]ood sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, 
whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness 
exceeding 6 mm.”7 
Millenium argued that 215 entries of its cut lumber, including two-
by-three, two-by-four and two-by-six lumber, cut to various lengths 
ranging from five to twenty feet and entered between October 1999 
and January 2001, should be classified either under HTSUS 
subheading 4418.90.40 as “[b]uilders’ joinery and carpentry of wood” 
or under HTSUS heading 4421 as “[o]ther articles of wood.”8  After 
Customs notified Millenium in December 2000 that it liquidated the 
merchandise under HTSUS heading 4407, Millenium filed two timely 
protests.9 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed.  The court found as a 
threshold matter that determining the meaning of tariff provisions is 
a question of law, while determining whether specific imports fall 
within certain tariff provisions is a question of fact.10  Citing the 
Explanatory Note to HTSUS heading 4407, which specifies that 
heading 4407 covers all wood and timber thicker than 6 mm “[w]ith a 
few exceptions,” the Federal Circuit upheld Customs’ classification of 
Millenium’s lumber under HTSUS heading 4407.11  The court 
rejected classification under HTSUS heading 4418, because 
Millenium’s lumber had not undergone sufficient working to 
                                                          
 5. See generally U.S. International Trade Commission, Tariff Information Center, 
By Chapter Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (last visited Apr. 7, 
2010), http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/bychapter/index.htm (establishing the 
HTSUS,  listed by chapter and general notes). 
 6. 558 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 7. Id. at 1327 (quoting Millenium Lumber Distribution Co. v.  United States, 
No. 02-00595, 2007 WL 1116148, at *4 (Ct. Int’l Trade Apr. 16, 2007)). 
 8. Id. at 1328 (internal quotations and citation omitted).  
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. (citing Universal Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 491 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)). 
 11. Id. at 1331 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in original); 
see also Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 282 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(finding that Customs’ classifications are presumptively correct, and that the 
protesting party bears the burden of proving otherwise). 
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constitute “joinery and carpentry.”12  The court also rejected 
classification under the catchall provision in HTSUS heading 4421 
because—under General Rule of Interpretation 3(a)’s rule of relative 
specificity, which provides that goods prima facie classifiable under 
two or more headings are properly classified in the most specific 
heading—it deemed HTSUS heading 4407 more descriptive.13 
In Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. United States,14 the Federal Circuit 
upheld an importer’s protest of Customs’ classification of deodorizer 
distillate (DOD), a residue from edible soybean oil production.15  
Customs classified DOD under HTSUS subheading 3824.90.28, a 
“catchall provision” for “[c]hemical products and preparations of the 
chemical or allied industries . . . not elsewhere specified or included:  
Other . . . :  Other.”16  Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) conceded that 
HTSUS heading 3824 covered the subject products but contended 
that other headings were more descriptive, and filed suit at the Court 
of International Trade seeking classification under HTSUS heading 
3825, a duty-free heading that provides for “[r]esidual products of 
the chemical or allied industries, not elsewhere specified or 
included.”17 
The Court of International Trade granted summary judgment for 
the government.18  It viewed the explanatory note to HTSUS 
subheading 3825 as providing an exhaustive list of four substances—
alkaline iron oxide, residues from antibiotics manufacture, 
ammoniacal gas liquors and spent oxide—that formed the complete 
list of items subject to classification in that subheading.19  The Federal 
Circuit reversed, finding HTSUS subheading 3825 appropriate and 
more descriptive than HTSUS subheading 3824.20 
First, the Federal Circuit found that “[DOD] falls within the 
ordinary meaning of the term ‘residual products,’” as it is left over 
from the distillation of soybean oil.21  The court rejected the 
government’s argument that the list of products in the Explanatory 
Note to HTSUS subheading 3825 was exhaustive due to “a notable 
                                                          
 12. Millenium Lumber, 558 F.3d at 1329–30 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
 13. Id. at 1330–31. 
 14. 561 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 15. Id. at 1310. 
 16. Id. (quoting U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Headquarters Ruling No. 967288 
(Mar. 10, 2005)). 
 17. Id. at 1310–11 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 18. Id. at 1311. 
 19. Id. (citing Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 20. Id. at 1317–18. 
 21. Id. at 1313–14. 
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absence of language in the Explanatory Note confining the list to the 
enumerated items or suggesting the list is exhaustive.”22  Because the 
court found no evidence that Congress intended for HTSUS 
headings 3824 and 3825 to be mutually exclusive, it deemed DOD 
prima facie classifiable in both headings.23  Pursuant to General Rule 
of Interpretation 3(a)’s rule of relative specificity, the Federal Circuit 
deemed the phrase “residual products” as used in HTSUS 
subheading 3825 more descriptive than general “chemical products” 
as used in HTSUS subheading 3824.24 
In Value Vinyls, Inc. v. United States,25 the Federal Circuit evaluated 
the proper tariff classification of plastic-coated fabric material, 
imported in sheets and used to make truck covers, dividers, 
upholstery, signs and other products.26  The Court of International 
Trade classified the product in HTSUS subheading 3921.90.11 as “a 
product with textile components in which man-made fibers 
predominate by weight over any other single textile fiber” because 
the product is made entirely of man-made fibers.27  The Federal 
Circuit agreed with this classification and affirmed.28 
The government argued that the word “predominate” in HTSUS 
subheading 3921.90.11 required at least two components and could 
not apply to products made of only one type of fiber.29  In rejecting 
this argument, the Federal Circuit accepted the Court of 
International Trade’s analysis that products made of only man-made 
fibers appeared in HTSUS subheading 3921.90.11, dating back to 
that subheading’s predecessor provision in the Tariff Schedule of the 
United States (TSUS), prior to harmonization.30  Citing legislative 
history indicating that the harmonization of the tariff schedule 
intended to adopt internationally accepted terminology without 
affecting classification or duties, the Federal Circuit found that no 
                                                          
 22. Id. at 1315.  The Federal Circuit rejected a similar line of argument in Airflow 
Tech., Inc. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1287, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that 
explanatory notes cannot override the plain meaning of a tariff provision, as 
explanatory notes “are not legally binding” (internal citations and quotations 
omitted)). 
 23. Archer Daniels, 561 F.3d at 1316–17. 
 24. Id. at 1317. 
 25. 568 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 26. Id. at 1375. 
 27. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Customs originally classified the goods 
under subheading 3921.90.19, HTSUS; Value Vinyls filed a protest seeking 
classification in Subheading 3921.90.11, HTSUS.  Id. at 1376. 
 28. Id. at 1375. 
 29. Id. at 1377. 
 30. See id. at 1377–79 (reasoning that, when the TSUS was harmonized into the 
HTSUS, no change in meaning was intended, and that wholly man-made fibers were 
then classified in the companion provision in the TSUS). 
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other HTSUS provision provided for wholly man-made fibers as did 
the TSUS predecessor provision to HTSUS subheading 3921.90.11.31  
Thus, Value Vinyls’ man-made fibers were properly classified under 
HTSUS subheading 3921.90.11.32 
United States v. UPS Customhouse Brokerage, Inc.33  presented the 
question of whether certain alleged misclassifications by UPS 
Customhouse Brokerage, Inc. also gave rise to multiple violations of 
19 U.S.C. § 1641, which obligates customs brokers to exercise 
reasonable supervision and control over their business.34  The Federal 
Circuit agreed with the Court of International Trade and with 
Customs that UPS misclassified certain merchandise, but vacated and 
remanded the Court of International Trade’s holding that UPS failed 
to exercise reasonable supervision and control over its business based 
on those misclassifications.35 
The dispute arose from UPS’s classifications under HTSUS 
heading 8473, which covers parts and accessories of automatic data 
processing (ADP) machines.36  Specifically, UPS classified sixty entries 
under HTSUS subheading 8473.30.9000 between January and May 
2000.37  Customs initiated eight separate penalty actions covering 
these sixty entries and argued that 8473.30.9000 required ADP 
machine parts to themselves contain a cathode ray tube (CRT), 
rather than merely be part of a computer that contained a CRT.38  
UPS paid some of the penalties, but Customs filed suit at the Court of 
International Trade in December 2004 to enforce the unpaid portion 
of the penalties (approximately $75,000).39  UPS unsuccessfully 
sought a summary judgment declaration that Customs may only assess 
one penalty for a maximum $30,000 under 19 U.S.C. § 1641.40 
After a bench trial, the Court of International Trade found that 
UPS misclassified the ADP machine parts and failed to exercise 
                                                          
 31. See id. at 1378–80 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 548 (1988) (Conf. Rep.); 
Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530, 532–33 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also 
Institution of Investigation for the Conversion of the Tariff Schedules of the United 
States into the Nomenclature of the Harmonized System, 46 Fed. Reg. 47,897, 47,897 
(Dep’t of Commerce Sept. 30, 1981)) (stating that the move from the TSUS to the 
HTSUS did not involve a change in the definition of the fiber itself, which previously 
included man-made fibers).   
 32. Id. at  1380. 
 33. 575 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 34. Id. at 1377. 
 35. Id. at 1377–78. 
 36. Id. at 1378. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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reasonable supervision and control in so doing.41  UPS appealed, and 
the Federal Circuit affirmed Customs’ and the Court of International 
Trade’s finding of misclassification but reversed and remanded on 
the section 1641 reasonable supervision issue.42   
Regarding its classifications, UPS argued that HTSUS subheading 
8473.30 divides items based on whether the ADP machine of which 
they are a part or accessory contains a CRT.43  The Federal Circuit:  
(1) ruled that “subheading 8473.30 demonstrates that there are two 
types of ‘parts and accessories’:  those ‘not incorporating a [CRT]’ 
and ‘other,’” and thus rejected UPS’s line of argument; (2) found 
that HTSUS subheading 8473 actually differentiated between ADP 
machine parts and accessories with and without a CRT; and (3) 
affirmed Customs’ classification in HTSUS subheading 8473.44 
In reversing and remanding the Court of International Trade’s 
decision on UPS’s section 1641 liability, the Federal Circuit reasoned 
that Customs had not considered the ten factors that it must evaluate 
under 19 C.F.R. § 111.1.45  Though the Federal Circuit deferred to 
Customs’ right to interpret its own regulations, the Federal Circuit 
cautioned that “this discretion does not absolve Customs of its 
obligation under the regulation to consider at the least the ten listed 
factors.”46  The court thus reversed and remanded for further analysis 
as to whether UPS violated 19 U.S.C. § 1641 in light of the  
19 C.F.R. § 111.1 factors.47 
In its second wood- and lumber-related classification decision of 
2009, the Federal Circuit considered the proper classification of 
laminated flooring panels in Faus Group, Inc. v. United States.48  Faus 
Group, Inc. made the flooring panels at issue out of a fiberboard core 
with a density of 0.85 to 0.95 g/cm3.49  The panels are nonstructural 
                                                          
 41. Id. at 1377. 
 42. Id. at 1377–78. 
 43. Id. at 1380.  UPS argued that, under the “last antecedent rule,” which 
provides that a limiting clause or phrase modifies only the word or phrase it 
immediately follows, the provision in subheading 8473.30 that reads “[n]ot 
incorporating a [CRT]” modifies the language in subheading 8473, HTSUS, “[p]arts 
and accessories . . . .”  Id. at 1381 (internal quotations omitted).  This argument 
proved unsuccessful, as the Federal Circuit ruled it would “strain[] logic and 
grammar.”  Id. at 1382. 
 44. Id. at 1381. 
 45. Id. at 1382–83.  Since the regulation at issue says that Customs “will” consider 
them, the Court added that “‘[w]ill’ is a mandatory term, not a discretionary one.”  
Id. at 1382 (citing New England Tank Indus. of N.H., Inc. v. United States, 861 F.2d 
685, 694 (Fed Cir. 1988)). 
 46. Id. at 1382. 
 47. Id. at 1383. 
 48. 581 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 49. Id. at 1370. 
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finished articles to be installed by their end-users over an existing 
structural subfloor.50  Each panel is grooved to facilitate assembly.51 
Customs classified these panels under HTSUS heading 4411, which 
provides for “[f]iberboard of wood or other ligneous materials, 
whether or not bonded with resins or other organic substances.”52  
Faus protested and sought classification under HTSUS subheading 
4418, which provides for “[b]uilders’ joinery and carpentry of wood, 
including cellular wood panels and assembled parquet panels; 
shingles and shakes.”53  Customs denied Faus’s protest, and Faus filed 
suit at the Court of International Trade.54 
In what the Federal Circuit described as a “fifty-three page 
analysis . . . that can only be described as Talmudic in its breadth and 
thoroughness,” the Court of International Trade deemed the floor 
panels prima facie classifiable under both HTSUS headings 4411 and 
4418.55  Under General Rule of Interpretation 3(a)’s rule of relative 
specificity, the Court of International Trade determined that HTSUS 
heading 4411 is the more specific of the two headings and thus more 
appropriate for classification.56  Faus timely appealed to the Federal 
Circuit.57 
The Federal Circuit sided with Faus and reversed the Court of 
International Trade.58  Citing Note 4 to Chapter 44 of the 
Harmonized System—which excludes wood products finished to the 
extent that they acquired “the character of articles of other headings”—the 
Federal Circuit analyzed whether Faus’ laminate floor panels had 
been processed to the extent that they had the character of articles in 
other tariff headings.59  The Federal Circuit adopted the Court of 
International Trade’s conclusion that Faus’ products are prima facie 
classifiable in both HTSUS headings 4411 and 4418 but appeared 
sympathetic to Faus’ reading of Note 4 to Chapter 44, that fiberboard 
processed such that it is prima facie classifiable in HTSUS heading 
4418 is thus excluded from HTSUS heading 4411.60   
                                                          
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Customs chose the eight-digit subheading 
4411.19.40, HTSUS, a residual provision for “[f]iberboard of a density exceeding 0.8 
g/cm3: Other: Other: Other.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 53. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1371 (citing Faus Group, Inc. v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 
1249–65 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 1374–75. 
 59. Id. at 1373. 
 60. Id. at 1373–74. 
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The Federal Circuit also employed a General Rule of 
Interpretation 3(a) analysis to avoid a final interpretation of Note 4 
to Chapter 44, and instead based its holding on the determination 
that HTSUS heading 4418’s requirement that wood products be 
processed makes it more specific than HTSUS heading 4411, which 
has no such processing requirement.61  The court added that HTSUS 
heading 4411 is broader than HTSUS heading 4418 because it covers 
any fiberboard product with the character of an article under 
another heading “as long as it was created using one of the many 
enumerated processes in Note 4.”62 
B. Valuation Issues 
The only valuation-related decision issued by the Federal Circuit 
concerned penalties levied against an importer for a multi-year 
double-invoicing scheme that Customs alleged served to substantially 
undervalue imports of Mexican frozen produce and deprive the 
government of more than $600,000 in duty revenue.63 
The Federal Circuit reaffirmed penalties assessed against an 
importer found guilty of a double-invoicing scheme to suppress the 
entered value of its goods in United States v. Inn Foods, Inc.64  The 
government alleged that Inn Foods, Inc. and its now-defunct Cayman 
Islands-based affiliate SeaVeg fraudulently entered frozen produce 
from and with the cooperation of six Mexican growers between 1987 
and 1990.65 
Inn Foods, SeaVeg and the Mexican growers agreed upon a 
double-invoicing system, in which the growers would issue a “factura” 
invoice to Inn Foods or SeaVeg with an invoice number, produce 
description and price.66  The price on this factura did not represent 
the price actually paid to the grower or the market value of the 
produce, and was in fact “substantially lower” than either of those 
figures.67  Inn Foods and SeaVeg would provide these facturas to their 
customs brokers, who would use it to enter the goods into the United 
                                                          
 61. See id. at 1373–75 (citing Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437, 
1441–42 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (stating that the heading with the most specific 
description shall be preferred to headings with a more general description). 
 62. Id. at 1374. 
 63. United States v. Inn Foods, Inc., 560 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 64. Id.  This was the Federal Circuit’s second review of this case.  Id. 
 65. Id. at 1341–42.  Inn Foods and SeaVeg shared a parent company, operated 
out of the same facility, shared employees and otherwise acted as alter egos.  Id. at 
1341. 
 66. Id. at 1341. 
 67. Id. 
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States through Customs.68  After receipt of the goods, Inn Foods and 
SeaVeg would create a second invoice with the original invoice 
number and produce description, but with the higher price reflecting 
the produce’s market value, and would then send it to the grower as 
an order confirmation.69  Inn Foods or SeaVeg would initially pay 
seventy percent of the higher amount, with the balance months later 
after the parties could determine the final market price of the 
produce.70 
Customs began to examine the entries made on behalf of Inn 
Foods and SeaVeg in 1988.71  In 1989, Customs’ third formal request 
for documentation led to the discovery of records indicating that the 
actual value of the entered produce vastly exceeded the values listed 
on the facturas used for entry purposes and presented to Customs.72  
After learning that Customs intended to investigate the case formally, 
Inn Foods added disclaimers to its entries that stated, in relevant part, 
“[t]he value being used on shipments . . . is strictly for customs 
clearance” and that “[l]iquidation . . . is to be withheld until the 
importer of record . . . is able to complete the audit of their files and 
arrive at a true transaction value.”73 
The government filed suit against Inn Foods in 2001 under  
19 U.S.C. § 1592, alleging that this fraudulent invoicing system 
deprived the government of significant duties owed.74  The Court of 
International Trade initially dismissed the suit as time-barred, but the 
Federal Circuit reversed.75  On remand, the Court of International 
Trade held a bench trial and ruled that Inn Foods submitted the 
materially false facturas with intent to defraud Customs.76  Inn Foods 
faced a monetary penalty of $7.5 million under 19 U.S.C.  
§ 1592(c)(1) and unpaid duties of $624,602.55 under 19 U.S.C.  
§ 1592(d).77  The Court of International Trade found Inn Foods 
                                                          
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1341–42. 
 72. Id. at 1342. 
 73. Id. at 1344–45. 
 74. Id. at 1342. 
 75. United States v. Inn Foods, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003), 
rev’d, 383 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
 76. See United States v. Inn Foods, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1357–59 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2007), aff’d, 560 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (describing that Inn Foods was 
involved in the scheme and explaining that the values given to the facturas were far 
less than later invoices for the same goods, which led to Inn Foods paying less duties 
that it owed to Customs). 
 77. Id. at 1361–62. 
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liable for the entire penalty amount because it acted as either an alter 
ego or aider and abettor of SeaVeg.78 
On appeal, Inn Foods contended that it acted merely with 
negligence when it filed false invoices and not with any fraudulent 
intent.79  In rejecting this theory, the Federal Circuit held that the 
evidentiary record confirmed the Court of International Trade’s 
determination that Inn Foods knew of the facturas’ falsity, and knew 
that its brokers would use the facturas to enter the subject produce 
into the United States.80  The court then called on precedent from 
the other circuit courts to confirm that “[i]nferring fraudulent intent 
from the knowing use of false invoices is hardly unique to the 
customs context.”81  The Federal Circuit also noted that Inn Foods 
and SeaVeg concealed the existence of the double-invoice system, 
even from their brokers.82  Moreover, Inn Foods and SeaVeg knew 
from their brokers that the values on the facturas were material to the 
produce’s entry and Customs’ valuation process.83 
Inn Foods claimed that the disclaimers added to the facturas in 
1989 “belie[d] any possibility that intent to defraud existed.”84  The 
Federal Circuit disagreed for three reasons.  First, the statement that 
the invoices existed “strictly for customs clearance” at best suggested 
that “the invoices contained a mere calculational error,” when in 
actuality Inn Foods presented intentionally falsified values.85  Second, 
the disclaimers’ suggestion of a pending audit to determine the 
produce’s value was implausible because Inn Foods possessed and 
kept in its records both the facturas and the true invoices, and thus 
                                                          
 78. Id. at 1356–57. 
 79. See Inn Foods, 560 F.3d at 1343 (explaining that fraudulent intent requires 
that a defendant “knowingly enter[] goods by means of a material false statement” 
(quoting United States v. Hitachi Am., Ltd., 172 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1999))); 
see also 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e)(2) (2006) (placing the burden on the United States to 
prove fraudulent intent by “clear and convincing evidence”).  
 80. See Inn Foods, 560 F.3d at 1343 (citing Inn Foods, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1354 n.12) 
(using as an example of Inn Foods’ knowledge of the facturas’ falsity a letter from a 
Mexican grower to SeaVeg which noted that the supplier would ship Broccoli Spears 
valued at $0.50/lb. with a factura listing them at $0.28/lb). 
 81. See id. at 1343 (citing United States v. Marek, 548 F.3d 147, 151–52 (1st Cir. 
2008) (inferring fraudulent intent from the use of false invoices in a tax fraud case)). 
 82. See id. at 1344 (noting that on at least one occasion SeaVeg told an inquiring 
broker that the factura values were low because it “obtained the produce at a good 
price”). 
 83. See id. (detailing that in one case, SeaVeg received detailed training on how 
Customs determined its duties, and one of Inn Foods’ brokers sent Inn Foods 
“itemization of costs, including a copy of the undervalued factura that had been 
presented to Customs and the duties paid based on that factura”).  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 1344–45. 
  
1088 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1077 
did not need an audit to learn the entered produce’s true value.86  
Third, the statement that Inn Foods would correct any valuation 
errors rang hollow because Inn Foods never filed any actual 
corrections with Customs.87 
Finally, Inn Foods challenged its liability for the entire sum of 
$624,602.55 in unpaid duties.88  Though the Federal Circuit 
conceded Inn Foods’ argument that Congress intended that 
“normally only importers of record and their sureties are liable for 
duty,”89 it also found that 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) “suggests that the party 
liable for penalties under [19 U.S.C. § 1592(a)] would also be liable 
under [19 U.S.C. § 1592(d)] for the lost duty.”90  The Federal Circuit 
further reasoned that Congress intended for parties liable as aiders 
and abettors to face liability for the duties lost by the government as a 
direct result of aiding and abetting.91  Thus, Inn Foods remained 
liable for the full amount of unpaid duties. 
C. Jurisdictional Issues 
The only purely jurisdictional issue presented to the Federal 
Circuit in 2009 concerned the Court of International Trade’s ability 
to review the revocation of a customs broker’s license for that 
broker’s failure to file a required periodic report of the broker’s 
business activity. 
In Schick v. United States,92 the Federal Circuit decided that the 
Court of International Trade lacks authority to review Customs’ 
decision to revoke a broker’s license for failure to file a triennial 
status report.93  The plaintiff, a customs broker for more than twenty 
years, failed to file a triennial status report on its due date and failed 
again to do so within the sixty-day grace period referenced in a letter 
sent to him by the applicable Customs Port Director.94  Two months 
after Customs revoked the plaintiff’s license, he requested a hearing 
and a withdrawal of the revocation under 19 U.S.C.  § 1641(d)(2)(B), 
                                                          
 86. Id. at 1345. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1346 (explaining Inn Foods’ argument that, since liability rested on a 
violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d), which applied only to importers, Inn Foods could 
not be found to violate that portion of the statute because it was not an importer).  
 89. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. §§ 1484–85 (2006); United States v. Blum, 858 F.2d 1566, 
1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).  
 90. Id. (pointing also to the broad language in 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) empowering 
Customs to collect any duties lost “as a result of a violation of subsection (a)”).  
 91. See id. at 1346–48 (concluding that “Congress intended to continue to impose 
liability for unpaid duty on any party guilty of fraud or aiding and abetting fraud”). 
 92. 554 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 93. Id. at 995. 
 94. Id. at 993–94. 
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which pertains to disciplinary proceedings against customs brokers.95  
Customs denied the request and reasoned that the license revocation 
constituted an operation of law under 19 U.S.C. § 1641(g)(1), and 
that the governing statute did not afford the plaintiff a right to a 
hearing.96 
Contending that Customs should have followed the procedures for 
disciplinary proceedings, the plaintiff sought relief in the Court of 
International Trade.  The Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4), but rejected the plaintiff’s request for relief.97  
Citing Retamal v. United States Customs & Border Protection,98 the Federal 
Circuit rejected the Court of International Trade’s basis for 
exercising jurisdiction in this matter.99  The Federal Circuit 
reaffirmed its holding in Retamal that revocation of a customs broker 
license for failing to file a triennial report does not relate to the 
disciplinary provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1641(g), and is not referenced 
anywhere in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(a)–(h) or (i)(1)–(3).100  In remanding 
this proceeding to the Court of International Trade, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that “19 U.S.C. § 1641(g) provides the Secretary 
with independent authority to revoke a customs broker’s license, an 
action that is unreviewable in the Court of International Trade,” and 
advised the court to consider whether the transfer statute,  
28 U.S.C. § 1631, applies.101 
D. Other Customs Issues 
The Federal Circuit considered whether an importer’s repeated 
Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT)102 payments when none were 
required should be treated as a remediable “inadvertence” or an 
irremediable mistake of law in Esso Standard Oil Co. (PR) v. United 
States.103  Congress amended the HMT statute in 1988 to exempt 
shipments between Alaska, Hawaii or “any possession of the United 
                                                          
 95. Id. at 994; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(2)(b) (2006) (setting forth the process 
by which a customs broker may respond to the notice of suspension and the 
procedure for conducting a hearing to determine if discipline is warranted). 
 96. Schick, 554 F.3d at 994. 
 97. Id. at 994–95. 
 98. 439 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 99. Schick, 554 F.3d at 995. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 995–96 (citing Butler v. United States, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2006)). 
 102. See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 4461–62(a) (2006) (defining the HMT as a fee 
imposed on “port use” by commercial vessels, charged ad valorem at 0.125 percent of 
the value of the vessels’ cargo).   
 103. 559 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (mentioning that the trial court defined 
Esso’s HMT payment as a “correctable inadvertence”).  
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States” to the U.S. mainland, Alaska, Hawaii or a U.S. possession.104  
Customs, which Congress tasked with administering the HMT laws, 
had not updated its regulations to reflect this new exemption for 
shipments between U.S. possessions.105 
Esso intentionally made $339,000 in unnecessary HMT payments 
between 1993 and 1997 for petroleum products it shipped between 
the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.106  Customs liquidated these 
entries between 1994 and 1997 without change and without 
refunding Esso’s HMT payments.107  Esso realized that possession-to-
possession shipments enjoyed an exemption from the HMT later in 
1997 and filed three separate requests for HMT refunds, which 
Customs treated as requests for reliquidation under 19 U.S.C.  
§ 1520(c).108  Customs denied all three requests because it considered 
the HMT payments “a mistake of law . . . [not] correct[able] under 
19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1).”109 
The Court of International Trade heard Esso’s challenge to 
Customs’ denial, and in a summary judgment ruling found that the 
HMT payments constituted a correctable “inadvertence” under 19 
U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) resulting from Customs’ failure to update its 
regulations to accord with the 1988 HMT amendments.110  On appeal, 
the Federal Circuit reversed the Court of International Trade’s 
holding that two of the three requests for reliquidation constituted 
correctable “inadvertences” and affirmed that the third request was 
time-barred.111 
                                                          
 104. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(b)(1) (1988). 
 105. Esso, 559 F.3d at 1298–99 (explaining that the amendment was designed to 
“alleviate the tax burden on domestic shipping between these ports”). 
 106. Id. at 1299 (mentioning that Esso made over eighty-seven liquidation entries 
during this period). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1299–1300 (noting that Customs determined that the requests did not 
qualify as timely protests under 19 U.S.C. § 1514).  The requests came more than 
ninety days after liquidation of the entries, and thus would not have qualified as 
timely protests in 1997.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1994), amended by Pub. 
L. No. 108-429, § 2103(2)(B), 118 Stat. 2434, 2597–98 (2004) (extending the protest 
deadline to 180 days).  
 109. Esso, 559 F.3d at 1300; see 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) (allowing for corrections 
based on clerical errors or “inadvertence[s]”), repealed by Pub. L. 108-429, § 2105, 118 
Stat. 2434, 2598 (2004)).  
 110. See Esso, 559 F.3d at 1300–01 (citing Esso Standard Oil Co. (PR) v. United 
States, No. 98-09-02318, 2007 WL 4125999 at *3 (Ct. Int’l Trade Nov. 20, 2007)).  
However, the Court of International Trade agreed with Customs, that one of the 
three requests was time-barred because it came more than one year after the last 
covered liquidation.  See id. at 1300–01. 
 111. See id. at 1308 (explaining that the request was time-barred because Esso had 
notified Customs of its HMT payments more than one year following liquidation). 
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Esso advanced four theories to defend its request for HMT refunds:  
first, that a Customs refund procedure in place for entities that pay 
quarterly HMT fees—instead of importers that pay per entry, as Esso 
did—should apply to Esso in this case;112 second, that a 1989 telex 
from Customs Headquarters created an alternative avenue for 
claiming HMT refunds;113 third, that the refund requests actually 
qualified as “exactions” under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(3);114 and fourth, 
that the statutory time limits of the applicable Customs statutes 
should be equitably tolled.115  The Federal Circuit rejected all four 
theories.116 
First, the Federal Circuit held that the subject refund procedure 
did not apply to importers at all, and cited Swisher International, Inc. v. 
United States,117 to confirm that a timely protest represented the sole 
avenue for importers to recover HMT payments.118  Second, the court 
declined to create a new refund procedure based on a 1989 telex 
because the stated purpose of that telex was merely to summarize the 
1988 HMT amendments, and not to create any procedures beyond 
what the 1988 amendments specified.119  Third, the court rejected 
Esso’s “exaction” argument, which relied on Swisher, because Swisher 
involved a quarterly HMT payer and not an importer.120  Finally, the 
court declined to adopt Esso’s equitable tolling argument because 
the statutory exemption from HMT payments took effect five years 
prior to Esso’s initial HMT overpayment, and “[e]quitable tolling 
cannot excuse this lack of diligence.”121   
The Federal Circuit then held as a general matter that Customs’ 
lack of diligence in failing to update its regulations in accordance 
with the 1988 amendments did not offset importers’ lack of diligence 
in understanding the HMT rules.122  In this regard, the court ruled 
that “an error is not an ‘inadvertence’ if it is the result of negligent 
inaction or an advertent misunderstanding of the law, regardless if 
                                                          
 112. Id. at 1301–02. 
 113. Id. at 1303. 
 114. See id. at 1303–04 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(3), amended by Pub. L. No.  
108-429, § 2103, 118 Stat. 2434, 2598 (2004). 
 115. Id. at 1304. 
 116. Id. at 1306–08. 
 117. 205 F.3d 1358, 1368 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 118. Esso, 559 F.3d at 1302–03. 
 119. Id. at 1303 (noting also that Esso could not identify any instance in which 
Customs issued a refund on those grounds). 
 120. Id. at 1304.  The government claimed that Esso’s “exaction” theory would 
permit any importer to file a timely request for reliquidation once Customs denied a 
protest as untimely.  Id. 
 121. Id. at 1305. 
 122. See id. at 1304–05 (noting that the error could have been avoided if Esso had 
made any effort to review the statute). 
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the inaction or misunderstanding was originally the fault of Customs 
or the importer.”123 
In Aectra Refining & Marketing, Inc. v. United States,124 the Federal 
Circuit considered a claim for a refund of HMT and Merchandise 
Processing Fee (MPF) payments on certain petroleum products 
subsequently used to produce export goods, commonly known as 
drawback.125  Aectra Refining and Marketing, Inc. imported 
petroleum products, paid customs duties, MPFs and HMTs, and 
subsequently exported finished petroleum products between 1987 
and 1997.126  The issue before the Federal Circuit was not whether 
Aectra’s imports and exports qualified for drawback, but rather 
whether Aectra made a timely drawback claim—normally within 
three years.127 
Aectra timely filed ten requests for drawback between 1997 and 
1998, but listed only the duties paid and omitted the MPF and HMT 
payments.128  At the time, Customs’ regulations did not allow for 
drawback on MPF or HMT payments, but Aectra conceded that it 
knew Customs’ policy in this regard was subject to ongoing judicial 
review.129  After Aectra filed its drawback claim—but while those 
claims could be timely amended or re-filed—the Federal Circuit 
determined that MPF payments were recoverable under drawback 
but that HMT payments were not.130  Congress later amended the 
drawback statute in 2004 to permit the recovery of HMT payments.131 
Though Aectra never amended its drawback claims during the 
three-year statutory period, it filed a protest prior to Congress’ 2004 
amendments, requesting MPF and HMT on the same entries for 
which it sought drawback in 1997 and 1998.132  Customs denied this 
                                                          
 123. Id. at 1306–07. 
 124. 565 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 125. Id. at 1366 (requiring Customs to refund 99% of “any duty, tax, or fee 
imposed under Federal law upon entry or importation” of merchandise that is later 
“exported, or . . . destroyed under customs supervision; and . . . is not used within the 
United States before such exportation or destruction”) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1313(j), 
(p) (2006)).   
 126. Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1366. 
 127. Id.  The statutory period for a drawback claim is three years. See 19 U.S.C.  
§ 1313(r)(1) (“A drawback entry and all documents necessary to complete a 
drawback claim . . . shall be filed or applied for, as applicable, within 3 years after the 
date of exportation or destruction . . . .”). 
 128. Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1367.  HMT and MPF payments are not eligible for 
drawback.  See 19 C.F.R. § 191.3(b) (2009).  
 129. Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1367 (citing Textport Oil Co. v. United States, 1 F. Supp. 
2d 1393 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1998), rev’d, 185 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 130. Textport, 185 F.3d at 1296, cited in Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1367. 
 131. Miscellaneous Trade & Technical Corrections Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.  
108-420, § 1557, 118 Stat. 2434, 2579 (2004). 
 132. Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1368. 
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protest, and Aectra appealed to the Court of International Trade.133  
Aectra argued that the 2004 drawback amendments suspended the 
three-year limit on HMT drawback claims, that its original drawback 
claims were sufficiently complete so as to entitle it to HMT and MPF 
payment refunds and that the futility of such claims based on 
Customs’ policy at the time the drawback claims were filed rendered 
them unnecessary.134  The Court of International Trade rejected these 
arguments and affirmed Customs’ denial of the claims.135 
In affirming the Court of International Trade, the Federal Circuit 
clarified that Congress’ 2004 drawback amendments, instead of 
creating a new right to HMT refunds, merely clarified that such 
refunds were always available under the statute.136  Citing Supreme 
Court precedent, the Federal Circuit found nothing in the 2004 
amendments that suggested intent to waive or otherwise modify the 
longstanding three-year statute of limitations on drawback claims.137  
The Federal Circuit also rejected Aectra’s argument that it did not 
have to include HMT and MPF payment amounts in its drawback 
request to complete a claim because 19 C.F.R. § 191.51(b) defines a 
“complete” claim as including a full calculation of the amount of 
drawback due.138  Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Aectra’s 
argument that requesting HMT and MPF payment refunds at the 
time it filed drawback requests was futile and thus not required.139  
Applying Supreme Court precedent in the area of tax law, the 
Federal Circuit reasoned that “futility does not excuse the failure to 
file a proper claim for limitations purposes.”140 
In Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States (Heartland VII),141 the 
Federal Circuit ruled that the Court of International Trade must treat 
the Circuit’s customs classification decisions as retroactively 
                                                          
 133. Id.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. (citing Aectra Refining & Marketing, Inc. v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 2d 
1318, 1327 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007), aff’d, 565 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 136. Id. at 1369–70. 
 137. Id. at 1370.  The court cited Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,  
696–98 (1979), for the proposition that newly enacted laws by Congress are 
presumptively harmonious with existing law and judicial concepts, thus rendering a 
lack of express modification of the three-year period in the 2004 amendments 
dispositive.  See Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1370. 
 138. Id. at 1371–72 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 191.51(b) (1998)). 
 139. Id. at 1373–74. 
 140. Id. at 1373.  In so concluding, the court referenced United States v. Clintwood 
Elkhorn Mining Co., 128 S. Ct. 1511, 1515–16 (2008), where the Supreme Court held 
that a party must have submitted a tax claim in order to preserve the right later to 
sue on the subject-matter of the claim, even though the party had little reason to 
believe that the IRS would accept it.  See Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1373.   
 141. 568 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Heartland VII).  
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applicable.142  Heartland By-Products’ dispute with Customs began in 
1995, when Customs issued a ruling letter classifying Heartland’s 
prospective sugar syrup imports as exempt from the Tariff Rate 
Quota (TRQ) duties on sugar.143  In 1999, after Heartland had 
established its sugar refining business and had commenced 
importing significant quantities of sugar syrup into the United States, 
Customs revoked its ruling letter and reclassified Heartland’s sugar 
syrup as subject to the substantially higher TRQ duties.144  Heartland 
filed suit at the Court of International Trade before Customs’ 
revocation and reclassification took effect.145  In Heartland I, the Court 
of International Trade determined that Customs’ revocation was 
unlawful and exempted Heartland’s imports from TRQ duties.146  In 
Heartland II, the Federal Circuit reversed Heartland I and upheld 
Customs’ reclassification.147  After the Heartland II decision, Heartland 
stopped importing the sugar syrup at issue.148 
Although Customs did not liquidate or reliquidate most of 
Heartland’s entries at the TRQ rate after the Heartland II mandate 
issued, some entries were liquidated or reliquidated at the TRQ rate 
prior to its issuance.149  Heartland protested these liquidations and 
reliquidations, while Customs sought more than $65 million in 
unpaid TRQ duties.150  Heartland also sought a judgment at the Court 
of International Trade that any liquidations or reliquidations made 
prior to the Heartland II mandate should not be subject to the TRQ 
rate, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1581(h).151  After Heartland appealed another suit dismissed by the 
Court of International Trade,152 the Federal Circuit reversed and 
concluded that the Court of International Trade had ancillary 
                                                          
 142. Id. at 1366. 
 143. Id. at 1362 (citing U.S. Customs & Border Prot., New York Ruling No. 810328 
(May 15, 1995), available at http://rulings.cbp.gov (search “NY 810328”)). 
 144. Id.  Customs’ authority to revoke rulings and reclassify products comes from 
19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) (2006).  In this case, the reclassification increased Heartland’s 
duties “by approximately two orders of magnitude.”  Heartland VII, 568 F.3d at 1362. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States (Heartland I), 74 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 
1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999), rev’d, 269 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 147. Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States (Heartland II), 264 F.3d 1126, 1137 
(Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 148. Heartland VII, 568 F.3d at 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 149. Id. at 1363. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. In this suit, Heartland sought a declaratory judgment that Customs could not 
liquidate or reliquidate Heartland’s entries at TRQ rates.  See Heartland By-Prods., 
Inc. v. United States (Heartland IV), 341 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1286–87 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2004), rev’d 424 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  The court dismissed the suit for lack of 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 1290. 
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jurisdiction to decide the scope of the Federal Circuit’s Heartland I 
decision.153 
On remand, the Court of International Trade granted Heartland’s 
motion for summary judgment and ruled that Customs must 
liquidate any entries made by Heartland before the Heartland II 
mandate issued at the non-TRQ rate.154  The court reasoned that 
retroactive liquidation at the TRQ rate would “undermine the 
purpose of pre-importation review.”155  On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
reversed.156 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Supreme Court’s general rule 
that judicial decisions have retroactive effect.157  The court rejected 
Heartland’s argument that the pre-importation review afforded by  
28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) represented an exception to this general rule, 
finding in the legislative history for that provision evidence that it was 
intended as “a very narrow and limited exception to th[e] rule” that 
the Court of International Trade “does not possess jurisdiction to 
review a ruling . . . unless it relates to a subject matter presently 
within the jurisdiction of the United States Customs Court.”158   
The Federal Circuit also determined that, contrary to Heartland’s 
contention that 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) would be rendered meaningless 
if importers could not rely on section 1581(h) decisions while they 
remained subject to appeal, the pre-importation process merely 
existed to allow importers the chance to challenge Customs rulings 
and exhaust all appeals before importing the goods at issue.159  Thus, 
the Federal Circuit found that its Heartland II decision applied 
retroactively to entries liquidated or reliquidated before the Heartland 
II mandate issued.160 
In its final Customs-related decision of 2009, Agro Dutch Industries, 
Ltd. v. United States,161 the Federal Circuit considered whether 
Customs’ liquidation of entries after the Court of International Trade 
                                                          
 153. See Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States (Heartland V), 424 F.3d 1244, 
1245 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 154. See Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States (Heartland VI), 521 F. Supp. 2d 
1386, 1392–93 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007), rev’d 568 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 155. Id. at 1392. 
 156. Heartland III, 568 F.3d at 1362.  
 157. Id. at 1365 (citing Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993)). 
 158. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1235, at 46 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729, 3758).  
 159. Id. at 1365–66. 
 160. Id. at 1369.  Heartland also argued in its appeal that Customs should not be 
allowed to seek unpaid TRQ duties on merchandise liquidated at the non-TRQ rate, 
but the Federal Circuit found the issue moot because “Customs will not seek to 
collect the TRQ duties it assessed in its liquidations and reliquidations before the 
Heartland II mandate issued.”  Id. at 1368. 
 161. 589 F.3d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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issued an injunction barring their liquidation but before that 
injunction took effect, mooted pending claims for reliquidation at a 
newer, lower duty rate.162  The Federal Circuit decided that it did not, 
and in that regard affirmed the holding of the Court of International 
Trade.163 
After the Department of Commerce published the final results of 
its second administrative review in the Court of International Trade 
of an antidumping duty order on preserved mushrooms from India, 
Agro Dutch Industries, Ltd. sought review of its 27.80% antidumping 
duty margin.164  Agro Dutch moved for a preliminary injunction to 
prevent liquidation of its covered entries during the pendency of its 
action.165  The government consented to this request, even though 
Agro Dutch filed it outside of the thirty-day deadline normally 
required by the Court of International Trade rules of practice.166 
The Court of International Trade granted Agro Dutch’s request for 
an injunction, which took effect five days after service on certain 
Commerce and Customs personnel.167  The government requested 
this five-day grace period to avoid “an inadvertent violation” of the 
injunction due to lack of notice by the applicable government agents 
or delay in dispensing the required instructions.168 
Commerce had previously issued liquidation instructions to 
Customs after its final administrative review results published.169  On 
the same day that Agro Dutch served the injunction on the 
appropriate Customs and Commerce personnel, “Customs acted on 
those [prior] instructions and liquidated nearly all of Agro Dutch’s 
entries.”170   
After “extensive” additional proceedings, Commerce recalculated 
Agro Dutch’s antidumping duty rate from 27.80% to 1.54%.171  The 
Court of International Trade sustained this significantly lower duty 
rate on review, and ordered that the entries be reliquidated at the 
lower duty rate.172 
Since Customs personnel had already liquidated nearly all of Agro 
Dutch’s entries at the higher duty rate on the same day that Agro 
                                                          
 162. Id. at 1189. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1189–90. 
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Dutch served the initial injunction, the government argued that the 
reliquidation request was moot.173  The Court of International Trade 
rejected this line of argument, noted that the injunction issued 
before the liquidations took place, and attributed the liquidations to 
“what might best be charitably described as ‘inadvertence.’”174  The 
Court of International Trade backdated the injunction and held that 
not granting relief would cause “manifest injustice” to the non-party 
importer of record, “which was likely to be rendered insolvent unless 
the entries were reliquidated at the proper, lower duty rate.”175 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that, under Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. United States,176 court actions in which liquidation has 
already occurred are ordinarily mooted.177  However, the Federal 
Circuit noted that it has previously acknowledged the existence of 
exceptions to that rule.178  When liquidation occurs in spite of an 
injunction to the contrary, for example, the Federal Circuit held that 
“not only does the trial court retain jurisdiction, but a broad array of 
remedies . . . [are] available to the court to rectify the unlawful 
liquidation.”179 
Since the injunction was issued solely to prevent liquidation 
pending a decision on Agro Dutch’s challenge, the Federal Circuit 
was skeptical that Customs’ mass liquidation on the day that the 
injunction was served amounted to merely a mistake.180  Indeed, the 
Federal Circuit emphasized that the five-day grace period “was not 
intended to allow the government to ‘rush in’ to liquidate the 
relevant entries and thereby avoid the effect of the injunction.”181  
Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed that Customs’ arguably suspicious 
liquidation of the enjoined entries did not moot Agro Dutch’s 
                                                          
 173. Id. at 1190. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.  
 176. 710 F.2d 806 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 177. 589 F.3d at 1190 (citing Zenith Radio Corp., 710 F.2d at 810, for the 
proposition that, in certain circumstances, liquidation would constitute irreparable 
injury). 
 178. Id. at 1191. 
 179. Id. at 1192.  For examples of remedies, the court referenced Allegheny 
Bradford Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1171 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004), in 
which the court refunded monies exacted pursuant to enjoined liquidation, and  
AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003), in 
which the court ordered the matter returned to status quo prior to liquidation 
following illegal acts by Customs. 
 180. See Agro Dutch, 589 F.3d at 1193 (suggesting that inadvertence was a dubious 
excuse because “the five-day window was apparently added [specifically] only to 
ensure against subjecting Customs officials to contempt sanctions for an inadvertent 
liquidation”). 
 181. Id. 
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request for reliquidation at the corrected, substantially lower duty 
rate.182 
II. TRADE REMEDIES LAWS 
Commerce and the ITC share the responsibility for conducting 
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations.183  Antidumping 
investigations attempt to combat “dumping” of products at less than 
fair value in the United States from other countries.184  Commerce has 
the responsibility of determining whether products are entering the 
United States and being sold at less than fair value, while the ITC 
determines whether this activity injures or threatens to injure a 
domestic industry in the subject goods.185  Countervailing duty 
investigations seek to determine whether a foreign government or 
public entity is subsidizing the manufacture of the subject goods.186 
A. Department of Commerce 
In 2009, the Federal Circuit decided seven cases involving 
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations.  Interestingly, all 
of these decisions stemmed from Commerce’s, and not the 
International Trade Commission’s, role in these investigations. 
In Belgium v. United States,187 the Federal Circuit reviewed 
Commerce’s liquidation instructions treating certain imports of 
stainless steel plate in coils (SSPC) as steel of Belgian—not German—
origin, and thus subject to antidumping and countervailing duties on 
Belgian SSPC.188  Plaintiffs-appellants Arcelor Stainless USA, LLC and 
Arcelor Trading USA, LLC imported SSPC and made cash deposits in 
compliance with the antidumping and countervailing duty orders, 
but alleged that it had mistakenly designated some of the SSPC as of 
Belgian origin when it was actually of German origin.189  Because 
                                                          
 182. Id. at 1194. 
 183. United States International Trade Commission, Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Investigations, http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/index.htm 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. 551 F.3d 1339 (Fed Cir. 2009). 
 188. Id. at 1341; see also Antidumping Duty Orders; Certain Stainless Steel Plate in 
Coils from Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Taiwan, 
64 Fed. Reg. 27,657, 27,756 (May 21, 1999); Notice of Amended Final 
Determinations: Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium, Italy and South Africa; 
and Notice of Countervailing Duty Orders: Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from 
Belgium, Italy and South Africa, 64 Fed. Reg. 25,189, 25,288 (May 11, 1999).  
 189. Belgium, 551 F.3d at 1344 (citing Ugine & Alz Belgium, N.V. v. United States, 
391 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1287 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2005) (Arcelor I), rev’d, 452 F.3d 1289 
(Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
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Arcelor appealed the results of Commerce’s first administrative 
review, albeit on other grounds, the subject entries were not 
liquidated.190 
Prior to the fourth administrative review, Arcelor discovered that it 
should have entered as of German origin some of the SSPC entered 
under the antidumping and countervailing duty orders during the 
first administrative review period.191  Arcelor believed, under the 
“substantial transformation” doctrine, that the SSPC at issue was of 
German origin because the steel was hot rolled in Germany and not 
further cold rolled in Belgium.192  Arcelor filed timely protests with 
Customs under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 and sent letters to Customs seeking 
to correct the origin designations and collect a refund of the 
deposits.193  Based on this logic, Arcelor did not include the SSPC that 
it considered of German origin in its questionnaire responses during 
the fourth administrative review.194 
Commerce accepted Arcelor’s argument and issued liquidation 
instructions alongside the fourth administrative review that “‘imports 
of SSPC hot rolled in Germany and not further cold rolled in 
Belgium are not subject to the antidumping duty order on SSPC from 
Belgium.  Entries of this merchandise made on or after 05/01/02 
should be liquidated without regard to antidumping duties.’”195 
In contrast, Commerce issued liquidation instructions that the 
entries covered by the first administrative review remain subject to 
antidumping and countervailing duties.196  Arcelor filed suit in the 
Court of International Trade to challenge the liquidation instructions 
specific to the first administrative review.197   
After the Federal Circuit initially remanded the Court of 
International Trade’s denial of the plaintiffs’ joint motion for a 
preliminary injunction,198 the Court of International Trade held that 
                                                          
 190. Id. (citing Ugine & Alz Belgium, N.V. v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 
1336 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007) (Arcelor IV)). 
 191. Id. at 1344. 
 192. Id. at 1345 (quoting Arcelor IV, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1337, n.5). 
 193. Id. (citing Arcelor I, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1287 and Arcelor IV, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 
1338). 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 1345 (quoting Dep’t of Commerce, Message No. 5182203, Liquidation 
Instructions for Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium Produced by Ugine & 
ALZ, N.V. Belgium (July 1, 2005)).  
 196. Id. at 1345–46 (citing Dep’t of Commerce, Message No. 5189204, Liquidation 
Instructions for Stainless Steel Plate Coils from Belgium (July 8, 2005), and Dep’t of 
Commerce, Message No. 5199201 Liquidation Instructions for Stainless Steel Plate 
Coils from Belgium (July 18, 2005)). 
 197. Id. at 1346. 
 198. Id. at 1346.  
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Commerce’s liquidation instructions were contrary to law.199  The 
lower court reasoned that “[p]laintiffs can not [sic] be expected to 
raise a challenge on an issue before it ripens or is revealed,” and “that 
Commerce may not impose duties on goods that” it has determined 
“are outside the scope of an antidumping or countervailing duty 
order.”200 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International 
Trade and rejected the government’s argument that Arcelor failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.201  The court 
reasoned that because the first administrative review “did not define 
what criteria should be applied to determine whether particular steel 
was Belgian in origin[,] nor did it state which entries were subject to 
antidumping or countervailing duties[,]” Arcelor had no relevant 
grounds on which to challenge the first administrative review, and 
thus, no administrative remedies to exhaust.202  The Federal Circuit 
viewed the government’s real argument as frustration that importers 
should not enjoy the ability to make such belated country-of-origin 
corrections, but held that “neither the [antidumping and 
countervailing duty] statute[,] nor the regulations impose a time 
limit on the correction of errors such as those made here by 
Arcelor.”203   
Therefore, the Federal Circuit found Commerce’s liquidation 
instructions for entries subject to the first administrative review as 
contrary to its long-established precedent that SSPC hot rolled in one 
country, and not further cold rolled elsewhere, originates in the 
country where it undergoes hot rolling.204  In this case, Arcelor and 
the fourth administrative review liquidation instructions correctly 
deemed SSPC hot rolled in Germany and not further cold rolled in 
Belgium, and therefore not of Belgian origin.205 
In NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States,206 the Federal Circuit 
reviewed Commerce’s decision, in a second sunset review of an 
antidumping duty order on ball bearings, to continue the order while 
reducing the dumping margins to levels lower than before the order 
                                                          
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. (quoting Ugine & ALZ Belgium, N.V. v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 2d 
1333, 1343 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007)).  
 201. Id. at 1349. 
 202. Id. at 1348. 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. at 1349. 
 205. Id. at 1346.  
 206. 557 F. 3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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took effect.207  The Federal Circuit affirmed Commerce’s decision to 
continue the order, but vacated and remanded the decision to 
reduce the subject dumping margins.208 
JTEKT Corporation and Koyo Corporation of U.S.A. (JTEKT) 
argued that Commerce’s second sunset review determination failed 
to consider evidence that JTEKT submitted, specifically that import 
levels did not decrease substantially, that a U.S. recession caused any 
decreases in JTEKT’s import levels around 2001,209 and that, more 
broadly, “substantial evidence” did not support Commerce’s 
decision.210  The Federal Circuit found it consistent with Commerce’s 
Statement of Administrative Action and Sunset Policy Bulletin to 
continue an antidumping duty order based merely on dumping at 
any level above de minimis, and thus found it unnecessary to consider 
JTEKT’s argument that Commerce failed to consider its evidence of 
import volume.211  Because JTEKT did not challenge the validity of 
the Statement of Administrative Action or the Sunset Policy Bulletin, 
the Federal Circuit inferred their validity.212  Moreover, the Federal 
Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States213 
that 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(i) “does not require us to invalidate a decision 
of Commerce if Commerce failed to explicitly address a party’s non-
dispositive argument.”214 
The Timken Company argued on cross-appeal that Commerce 
both lacked substantial evidence to reduce the subject dumping 
margins and deviated from its established methodology in the 
process.215  Noting for example that Commerce did not specify what 
data it used to determine certain importer’s import volumes, the 
Federal Circuit agreed with Timken and found that: 
it is difficult to square many of Commerce’s statements that the 
Japanese importers’ levels of imports were steady or increasing with 
                                                          
 207. Id. at 1318, 1320.  See generally Antifriction Bearings (Other than Tapered 
Roller Bearings) & Parts Thereof From Japan, 54 Fed. Reg. 18,873, 19,101 (Dep’t of 
Commerce May 3, 1989). 
 208. NMB Singapore Ltd., 557 F.3d at 1331.  
 209. Id. at 1320. 
 210. Id.; see Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (holding that the Federal Circuit will support Commerce’s decisions unless 
they are “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law” (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2000))).  
 211. NMB Singapore Ltd., 557 F.3d at 1320–22 (citing Policies Regarding the 
Conduct of Five-year (“Sunset”) Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Orders, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,817, 18,871 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 16, 1998); 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4213–14).  
 212. Id. at 1322.  
 213. 421 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 214. NMB Singapore Ltd., 557 F.3d at 1323 (citing Timken, 421 F.3d at 1357). 
 215. Id. at 1323. 
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the actual data before Commerce, even if we accepted the 
arguments that Commerce could permissibly consider different 
types of import data and different segments of the five-year review 
period for different importers while ignoring pre-order levels.216 
The Federal Circuit further agreed that Commerce deviated from 
its past practice of comparing pre-order volumes to volumes during 
the life of an antidumping order because Commerce only considered 
volumes during the life of the order in this instance.217  The Federal 
Circuit also vacated and remanded Commerce’s recalculation of its 
dumping margins for further analysis of whether Commerce correctly 
substituted respondents’ export data for Japanese companies’ U.S. 
market share, the traditional relevant metric.218 
In Sango International L.P. v. United States,219 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed Commerce’s determination, on remand, that Sango 
International L.P.’s gas meter swivels and nuts fell within the scope of 
the antidumping duty order on certain malleable iron pipe fittings 
(MIPFs) from China.220  Sango’s products came under the scope of 
the subject antidumping duty order because Customs classified them 
upon entry under HTSUS subheading 7307.19.90.60, which covers 
“[t]ube or pipe fittings (for example, couplings, elbows, sleeves), of 
iron or steel: Cast fittings: Other: Other Threaded.”221  Sango 
requested classification under HTSUS subheading 9028.90.00 as parts 
for and accessories to gas meters, but Customs denied this request.222 
                                                          
 216. Id. at 1326. 
 217. Id. at 1329; accord Save Domestic Oil, Inc. v. United States, 357 F.3d 1278, 
1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[I]f Commerce has a routine practice for addressing like 
situations, it must either apply that practice or provide a reasonable explanation as to 
why it departs therefrom.” (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983))). 
 218. See NMB Singapore Ltd., 557 F.3d at 1331 (“[I]f it is the case that the U.S. 
market share of the Japanese companies could be determined from the data before 
Commerce, then Commerce’s determination went against the practice it had 
established as of the time of the decision under review.”). 
 219. 567 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 220. Id. at 1364.  See generally Certain Malleable Iron Pipe Fittings from the 
People’s Republic of China, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,376, 69,377 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 
12, 2003).  The Federal Circuit remanded Commerce’s first scope determination in 
this matter for lack of substantial evidence to support the determination.  See Sango 
Int’l, L.P. v. United States, 484 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (considering the 
factors set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) as required by the Federal Circuit, 
Commerce reached the same decision on remand); Sango Int’l L.P. v. United States, 
556 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1332–38 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008), aff’d, 567 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (detailing the § 351.225(k)(2) factors:  “(i) the physical characteristics of the 
product; (ii) the expectations of the ultimate purchasers; (iii) the ultimate use of the 
product; (iv) the channels of trade in which the product is sold; and (v) the manner 
in which the product is advertised and displayed.”) (quoting 19 C.F.R.  
§ 351.225(k)(2) (2008)). 
 221. Sango Int’l Ltd., 567 F.3d at 1359.  
 222. Id. 
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Commerce’s remand determination followed the requirements of 
19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) and generally determined that Sango’s gas 
meter swivels and nuts cannot be used without each other and were 
properly classified in the tariff heading that subjected them to the 
applicable antidumping duty order.223  The Court of International 
Trade affirmed Commerce’s remand determination, accepting its 
arguments that Sango’s parts are distributed through the same 
avenues of trade as MIPFs and to purchasers of MIPFs, among other 
factors.224 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Sango argued that both 
Commerce’s decision to treat its products collectively and 
Commerce’s remand determination lacked substantial evidence in 
the record.225  The Federal Circuit rejected Sango’s first argument 
because it agreed with Commerce and the Court of International 
Trade that Sango’s gas meter swivels and nuts could not be used 
without each other, and the fact that Sango packaged and sold the 
products separately was unavailing as a matter of law.226  Sango’s 
second argument failed because the Federal Circuit read the 
antidumping duty order as including MIPFs that connect a pipe or a 
pipe fitting to an apparatus, which Sango’s gas meters and swivels 
did.227  The Federal Circuit further found that Sango’s gas meters and 
swivels and the MIPFs subject to the antidumping duty order shared 
physical characteristics and were marketed through the same 
channels of commerce.228 
In Huvis Corp. v. United States,229 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
Commerce’s use of a constructed market price in valuing Huvis 
Corporation’s imported polyester staple fiber subject to an 
antidumping duty order.230  Huvis appealed after Commerce issued its 
findings in the fifth administrative review.231   
                                                          
 223. Id. at 1359–60 (finding that Sango’s products must bond together to 
function, that Sango’s own scope ruling request treated them as one collective 
product, that gas meter nuts cannot be used without gas meter swivels, and that they 
are generally “never used individually”). 
 224. Id. at 1362.  
 225. Id.; see also Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (establishing that the Federal Circuit will defer to Commerce’s scope 
rulings unless it finds them to be “unsupported by substantial evidence on the 
record, or otherwise not in accordance with law” (quoting 19 U.S.C.  
§ 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994))). 
 226. Sango Int’l Ltd., 567 F.3d at 1363. 
 227. Id. at 1363–64. 
 228. Id. at 1364. 
 229. 570 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 230. Id. at 1353. 
 231. Id. at 1348. 
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Huvis purchased all of a key component used in the production of 
polyester staple fiber from affiliated companies during this period, 
which triggered the “major input rule” under 19 U.S.C.  
§§ 1677b(f)(2)–(3) and 19 C.F.R. § 351.407(b).232  The “major input 
rule” requires Commerce to determine the value of an affiliate-
sourced key production component as the higher of (1) the transfer 
price, (2) the market value, or (3) the cost of production.233 
As it had done previously, during the fifth administrative review, 
Commerce requested that Huvis submit the transfer price, market 
value and cost of production for the major inputs at issue.234  For 
qualified-grade and purified terephthalic acids—the major inputs at 
issue—Huvis submitted only transfer price and cost of production, 
explaining that its supplier considered market price data 
proprietary.235  Though Commerce had, in three of four cases, 
previously applied the major input rule for only the two measures 
Huvis supplied, for the fifth administrative review Commerce chose 
to construct a market price from “facts available.”236  In this case, 
Commerce arrived at a market price by adding an average profit rate, 
taken from suppliers’ submitted financial statements, and added it to 
Huvis’ submitted cost of production.237  This constructed market price 
exceeded both the transfer price and cost of production submitted by 
Huvis, and thus Commerce used it to value the subject major 
inputs.238 
Huvis filed suit in the Court of International Trade to challenge 
Commerce’s constructed market price as unsupported by substantial 
evidence.239  The Court of International Trade found that 
Commerce’s constructed market value—which relied on Huvis’ own 
data—was supported by substantial evidence and did not apply any 
adverse inferences against Huvis.240  The Court of International Trade 
nonetheless remanded to Commerce based on the court’s finding 
that Commerce’s use of constructed market price was inconsistent 
                                                          
 232. Id. at 1348–49.  
 233. Id. at 1349 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 351.407(b) (2009)). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See id. (“Commerce is required to use the facts otherwise available in reaching 
the applicable determination” if “necessary information is not available on the 
record” (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Commerce may not draw “adverse inferences” against an importer, absent that 
importer’s failure to cooperate with the investigation.  Id. at 1350 (citing  
§ 1677e(b)). 
 237. Id. at 1350. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
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with its past practice of simply using the highest available price 
measure.241 
On remand, Commerce stood by its methodology and explained 
that it only now realized it had enough data to construct a market 
price, and that doing so provided “a more complete analysis under 
the major input rule, and result[ed] in a more accurate calculation of 
Huvis’s dumping margin.”242  The Court of International Trade 
accepted this methodology and affirmed Commerce’s constructed 
market value determination.243 
Huvis appealed to the Federal Circuit, again under the theory that 
the constructed market price was unsupported by substantial 
evidence and contrary to law.244  Huvis argued that Commerce’s 
standard practice was to look only at the available measures and not 
to construct a major input value, which made it the “law of the 
proceeding” and a practice that Huvis should expect from Commerce 
during the fifth administrative review.245  Finally, Huvis argued that 
Commerce’s methodology of adding cost of production to profit 
renders the cost of production variable in the major input test 
meaningless, since the market value would always be higher.246 
First, the Federal Circuit found that Commerce’s constructed 
market value methodology in this case was permissible under the 
antidumping statute.247  The Federal Circuit deemed Commerce’s 
addition of an average profit to cost of production reasonable “since 
there is no suggestion here that product sales were unprofitable or 
that the profit margins were unusually low.”248  The court also found it 
reasonable for Commerce to differentiate between varying grades of 
terephthalic acids because Huvis’ own transfer price data showed that 
it paid more for higher grade materials.249 
                                                          
 241. Id. 
 242. Huvis Corp. v. United States, No. 06-00380, 2008 WL 2977890, at *2 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade Aug. 5, 2008), aff’d 570 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 243. Huvis, 570 F.3d at 1351. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id.  Huvis also argued that Commerce’s construction of a market price 
amounted to a penalty on Huvis for failing to provide market value data that, 
because its suppliers would not share, Huvis could not provide.  Id. 
 246. Id. at 1351–52. 
 247. See id. at 1353 (“[T]he new policy is permissible under the statute, . . . there 
are good reasons for it, and . . . the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious 
change of course adequately indicates.” (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1804 (2009))). 
 248. Id. at 1354. 
 249. Id. 
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Second, the Federal Circuit ruled that Commerce had a “good 
reason” to deviate from its past practice.250  In this case, the court 
endorsed Commerce’s determination that it could increase the 
accuracy of its estimated market prices—and consequently its 
dumping margins—by calculating the market price for Huvis.251  The 
court rejected Huvis’s argument that Commerce could not abruptly 
change course, as Huvis offered no evidence of actual detrimental 
reliance.252  Thus, Commerce was permitted to proceed with its fifth 
administrative review based on a calculated market price for certain 
of Huvis’ terephthalic acids.253 
Ningbo Dafa Chemical Fiber Co. v. United States254 concerned an 
antidumping duty investigation of recycled polyester staple fiber 
(PSF) from China.255  Commerce issued a final determination 
imposing a 4.86% dumping rate for Ningbo Dafa Chemical Fiber 
Co.256  The Federal Circuit agreed with the Court of International 
Trade and affirmed Commerce’s final determination, finding that it 
was supported by substantial evidence.257 
PSF is made in part from recycled polyethylene terephthalate 
(PET) bottle flake, and the color of the PET flake used in production 
corresponds with the color of the finished PSF.258  Commerce 
requested the invoices from Ningbo’s market economy purchases of 
PET flake during its investigation, in furtherance of its obligation to 
use the “best available information” to value the subject PSF.259  In 
response, Ningbo gave Commerce fifty-eight invoices from its 
qualifying market economy PET purchases, but very few of those 
identified the color of PET flake purchased.260  After Commerce 
unsuccessfully made a second inquiry for invoices that matched 
purchase price with PET flake color, Commerce made its 
                                                          
 250. Id. (citing Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1811; Nippon Steel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 494 F.3d 1371, 1377–78 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 251. Id. at 1355. 
 252. Id.  The Court had previously been persuaded by the company’s claims of 
detrimental reliance when this reliance could be demonstrated.  See Fox Television, 
129 S. Ct. at 1811 (providing that in changing a policy an agency must consider the 
reliance interests at stake); Shikoku Chems. Corp. v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 417, 
421 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1992) (overturning Commerce’s use of a new methodology since 
respondents demonstrated reliance on the old methodology). 
 253. Huvis, 570 F.3d at 1356. 
 254. 580 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 255. Id. at 1249.  PSF is used to stuff consumer items, such as sleeping bags, 
mattresses, pillows, and furniture.  Id. at 1250. 
 256. Id. at 1253. 
 257. Id. at 1262. 
 258. Id. at 1250. 
 259. Id. at 1250–51 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (2006)). 
 260. Ningbo, 580 F.3d at 1251. 
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determination based on “neutral partial ‘facts available’” 
inferences.261 
First, the Federal Circuit upheld Commerce’s use of “facts 
available” inferences in this case because “Ningbo did not provide the 
requested information in the form and manner requested” and 
because Commerce reasonably determined the color of PET flake to 
be relevant to its value.262  The court emphasized that the reason 
behind a respondent’s failure to provide information reasonably 
requested by Commerce is “of no moment”—including if the 
respondent is from a non-market economy country—and the failure 
alone allows Customs to make facts available inferences.263 
Second, the Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence 
supported Commerce’s final determination.264  The court deferred to 
Commerce’s conclusion that it required color-specific PET flake 
values and that color-specific, surrogate PET flake values from India 
did not exist.265  The Federal Circuit then decided that Commerce’s 
application of its neutral facts available inferences was supported by 
substantial evidence.266  Noting that Commerce’s methodologies are 
“presumptively correct” under Thai Pineapple Public Co. v. United 
States267 and Florida Citrus Mutual v. United States,268 Ningbo’s claim that 
it would have been impossible to produce color-specific PET flake 
invoices as requested by Customs was not persuasive.269  In the court’s 
view, Commerce had incomplete information to work with and acted 
reasonably when it used the best information available to assign 
colors to the market economy invoices that lacked colors.270  
Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence 
supported Commerce’s color-specific PET flake valuations, both 
because the incomplete information provided by Ningbo made an 
exact correlation between Ningbo’s PET flake purchases and its PSF 
production possible271 and because Commerce’s calculated values 
matched up with the prices derived from a co-respondent that did 
                                                          
 261. Id. (citing Certain Polyester Staple Fiber from the People’s Republic of 
China, 72 Fed. Reg. 19,690, 19,691 (Apr. 19, 2007)). 
 262. Id. at 1252.  The court also noted that Commerce applied neutral, rather 
than adverse, facts available.  Id. 
 263. Id. at 1254. 
 264. Id. at 1257. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 1256. 
 267. 187 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 268. 550 F.3d 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 269. Ningbo, 580 F.3d at 1259–60. 
 270. Id. at 1261. 
 271. Id. 
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provide color-specific PET flake invoices.272  Thus, Commerce’s final 
determination and dumping margin for Ningbo were affirmed.273 
The Federal Circuit upheld an “adverse facts available” (AFA) 
antidumping ruling in PAM, S.P.A. v. United States.274  The appeal 
considered the Court of International Trade’s affirmance of 
Commerce’s determination of a 45.49% AFA margin for PAM S.P.A. 
(PAM), an Italian producer and exporter of pasta, in compliance 
with the Court of International Trade’s earlier instructions on 
remand to recalculate an AFA antidumping margin in accordance 
with 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c).275 
This appeal concerned the sixth administrative review, during 
which PAM filed questionnaire responses with Commerce and 
participated in the verification of its sales databases.276  However, PAM 
failed to report sales to AGEA, a governmental entity, and a set of 
invoices for pasta shipped directly from an external warehouse to 
PAM’s customers.277  These omissions represented approximately two-
thirds of PAM’s total domestic sales.278 
Based on these omissions, Commerce determined that PAM failed 
to cooperate with its investigation and applied an AFA margin.279  The 
AFA margin of 45.49% applied to PAM represented the highest 
margin applied to any party that had been previously upheld in the 
course of the investigation.280  PAM challenged Commerce’s decision 
and the Court of International Trade remanded, finding that 
Commerce had not “adequately corroborated” the subject margin.281  
On remand, Commerce took into account PAM’s databases but 
found the same margin that it found in the sixth administrative 
review.282 
Noting that “Congress has made very clear the importance of 
accurate and complete reporting of home market sales to the 
Department of Commerce,” the Federal Circuit found that 
                                                          
 272. Id.  
 273. Id. at 1262. 
 274. 582 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 275. Id. at 1338.  See generally Notice of Antidumping Duty Order and Amended 
Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value:  Certain Pasta from Italy, 61 
Fed. Reg. 38,547 (Dep’t of Commerce July 24, 1996) (discussing obligations of 
parties subject to administrative protective orders). 
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of the Antidumping Duty Order on Certain Pasta from Italy, 68 Fed. Reg. 47,020 
(Aug. 7, 2003)). 
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“Commerce’s discretion in applying an AFA margin is particularly 
great when a respondent is uncooperative by failing to provide or 
withholding information.”283  The court identified substantial 
evidence for the 45.49% AFA margin based on Commerce’s finding 
that at least twenty-nine sales occurred with margins at or above 
45.49%.284  The court rejected PAM’s argument that its high margin 
sales were mere outliers, as 0.5% of total sales, based on Ta Chen 
Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States.285  In that case, the Federal 
Circuit held that, “[s]o long as the data is corroborated,” Commerce 
may choose to rely on a small subset of data to support an AFA 
margin.286 
Qingdao Taifa Group Co. v. United States287 required the Federal 
Circuit to decide whether the Court of International Trade had the 
power to halt liquidation of entries for importers of hand trucks 
made and exported by Qingdao Taifa Group Co. (Taifa) so that Taifa 
could challenge antidumping duties imposed on it by Commerce.288  
Various U.S. companies purchased Taifa hand trucks in 2005 and 
2006 and paid cash deposits pursuant to the applicable antidumping 
duty order, but Taifa did no importation of its own and thus paid no 
cash deposits directly.289  Commerce later notified all interested 
parties of the opportunity to request a review of the entries.290  
Commerce initiated a review based in part on Taifa’s request and 
sent personnel to China to visit Taifa and interview its employees.291 
During its visit to China, Commerce detected “concealment, 
destruction, and tampering with responsive documents” and, as a 
result, applied an AFA margin under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) and 
assigned the general antidumping duty rate used for China, which 
was much higher than the rate generally applied to individual 
exporters.292  Taifa challenged this determination at the Court of 
International Trade, which granted Taifa’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction and halted liquidation pending the outcome of its 
                                                          
 283. Id. at 1339–40 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (2006)); see also F. Illi De Cecco Di 
Filippo Fara S. Martino S.P.A. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(explaining that Commerce is inclined to select adverse facts to deter companies 
from being uncooperative). 
 284. PAM, 582 F.3d at 1340. 
 285. 298 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 286. Id. at 1339 (citing Illi De Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1032). 
 287. 581 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 288. Id. at 1377. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 1377–78. 
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review.293  Certain domestic producers who later intervened in the 
Court of International Trade action appealed to the Federal 
Circuit.294 
The Federal Circuit reviewed the Court of International Trade’s 
grant of an injunction under an “abuse of discretion” standard.295  
Pursuant to this standard, the lower court will only be reversed if it 
“made a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors or 
exercised its discretion based on an error of law or clearly erroneous 
fact finding.”296 
As an initial matter, the Federal Circuit rejected the government’s 
argument that the intervening domestic producers had waived their 
right to participate because they did not intervene until after the 
injunction was granted.297 
In affirming the Court of International Trade’s decision, the 
Federal Circuit determined that Taifa faced irreparable forfeiture in 
the event that an injunction was not granted.298  The court further 
reasoned that no other statutory framework or process existed for 
Taifa to challenge the validity of Commerce’s chosen antidumping 
duty margins, and thus the company would have no recourse after 
liquidation was completed.299  Moreover, the court found that the 
legislative history of the antidumping statute supports an injunction, 
as “[t]he Tariff Act . . . expressly contemplates protections for foreign 
as well as domestic manufacturers.”300  And the court finally 
determined that Taifa demonstrated “at least a ‘fair chance of success 
on the merits.’”301  Though “no party proffers any significant evidence 
about the merits of the imposed tariff rate,”302 Taifa at least claimed 
that it should not be subject to the China-wide rate because it is not a 
government-controlled entity.303  Based on this limited argument, the 
                                                          
 293. Id. at 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  In fact, the Court of International Trade 
granted the requested injunction before the deadline passed for the government to 
file its reply.  Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 1379 (quoting Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 
1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 296. Id. (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Chiron Corp., 384 F.3d 1326, 
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 297. See id. (reasoning that the domestic producers could not control the fact that 
the Court of International Trade ruled before the deadline passed for parties to file 
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 298. Id. at 1380. 
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 300. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 96-249 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 636). 
 301. Id. at 1381 (quoting U.S. Ass’n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. Dep’t of 
Commerce, 413 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
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Federal Circuit saw no cause to overturn the Court of International 
Trade’s finding that Taifa demonstrated some likelihood of success 
on the merits.304  Therefore, the Federal Circuit sustained the 
injunction granted by the Court of International Trade.305 
B. International Trade Commission 
The Federal Circuit issued only one decision in 2009 arising out of 
the ITC, and it related to the constitutionality of the now-repealed 
Byrd Amendment.306  The case discussed below continued to the 
Federal Circuit, even though Congress repealed the statute, because 
the private parties’ claim for distributions predated the Amendment’s 
repeal.307 
In 2009, the Federal Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the 
Byrd Amendment,308 which provided for the distribution of 
antidumping duties collected by the federal government to certain 
“affected domestic producers” of the dumped goods, against First 
and Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment challenges.309  SKF USA (SKF) 
challenged the ITC’s 2005 denial of its request for Byrd Amendment 
distributions.310  The ITC reasoned in its denial that SKF was not 
eligible for distributions because it was not a petitioner and had not 
supported the petition resulting in the antidumping duty order.311  
The Court of International Trade agreed with SKF and found that 
the Byrd Amendment’s language that limited eligible claimants to 
petitioners or supporters of the petition violated the equal protection 
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.312 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit declined to decide threshold 
questions of jurisdiction and simply assumed that the Court of 
International Trade had jurisdiction to hear SKF’s claim and that the 
                                                          
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 1382. 
 306. See SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 556 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 583 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (concluding 
that the Byrd Amendment is constitutional). 
 307. See id. at 1341–42 (discussing the history of the Byrd Amendment). 
 308. Congress repealed the Byrd Amendment in 2006, but the case discussed 
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See Repeal of Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601, 
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 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
  
1112 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1077 
claim was not barred by any applicable statute of limitations.313  The 
Court further determined that, since SKF challenged the Byrd 
Amendment as applied to its claim for distributions and not on its 
face, the claim could only accrue once SKF filed suit to collect the 
duties.314 
Stressing its adherence to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, 
the Federal Circuit first considered SKF’s First Amendment 
argument.315  The Court rejected SKF’s argument that the Byrd 
Amendment’s restriction of distributions functioned to penalize 
domestic producers who declined to speak in support of 
antidumping petitions because “[p]arties who are awarded 
antidumping distributions under the Byrd Amendment may say 
whatever they want about the government’s trade policies generally 
or about the particular antidumping investigation, provided they do 
so outside the context of the proceeding itself.”316  In this regard, the 
Federal Circuit found that the Byrd Amendment, rather than chilling 
opposing views, rewards the efforts of domestic producers who aid 
enforcement.317 
SKF based its equal protection argument on the theory that no 
rational basis for distributing antidumping duties only to domestic 
producers that supported an antidumping petition furthered the 
compensatory purpose of the Byrd Amendment.318  The government 
countered that the Byrd Amendment “identifies a group of 
beneficiaries that are entitled to compensation for unfair trade 
practices” and thus rationally supports its purpose.319  The Court of 
International Trade agreed with SKF because it saw the antidumping 
laws as “designed to benefit entire industries rather than individual 
companies.”320  But the Federal Circuit rejected this line of reasoning 
and—extending its First Amendment findings to its equal protection 
analysis—found that the Byrd Amendment was rationally related to 
                                                          
 313. See id. at 1348 (“We assume, but do not decide, that the statute of limitations 
in § 2636(i) is jurisdictional . . . .”).  
 314. Id.  
 315. See id. at 1349 (recognizing the obligation of courts to construe statutes to 
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the legitimate purpose of enforcing U.S. trade laws and rewarding 
those in the private sector who assist in that enforcement.321 
In a split decision, the Federal Circuit denied a petition for a panel 
rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc on September 29, 
2009.322 
CONCLUSION 
In 2009, the Federal Circuit issued nineteen precedential 
international trade-related decisions that will undoubtedly prove 
important to both the import and export community’s day-to-day 
business operations and the future activities of Customs, Commerce 
and the ITC.  The Federal Circuit’s review of international trade-
related appeals from the Court of International Trade remains a 
small but extremely important body of law, and the Federal Circuit’s 
role in creating judicial precedent for the ever-changing regime of 
U.S. trade policy and trade regulations is only likely to increase with 
time. 
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